This paper uses longitudinal data from Current Population Surveys conducted between 2004 and 2006 to estimate the net impact of Hurricane Katrina-related evacuation on various indicators of well-being. While evacuees who have returned to the affected region show evidence of returning to normalcy in terms of labor supply and earnings, those who persisted in other locations exhibit large and persistent gaps, even relative to the poor outcomes of individuals destined to become evacuees observed prior to Katrina. Evacuee outcomes are not demonstrably better in destination communities with lower initial unemployment or higher growth rates. The impact of evacuation on total income was blunted to some extent by government transfer payments and by self-employment activities. Overall, there is little evidence to support the notion that poor underemployed residents of the New Orleans area were disadvantaged by their location in a relatively depressed region.
The Katrina Effect: Was There a Bright Side to the Evacuation of Greater New Orleans?
I. Introduction
This paper uses data from the Current Population Survey to track the labor force participation and income of individuals who were forced to evacuate the greater New Orleans area in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall on August 29, 2005 . The longitudinal nature of the CPS sample permits the estimation of difference-in-difference type models, tracking the outcomes of individuals who evacuated and then returned to their original address, and comparing the outcomes of individuals who disappeared from the sample after August 2005 to individuals who entered the sample and claimed evacuee status afterward.
While this paper can be read as a narrow documentation of the experience of Katrina evacuees, this evidence can also shed light upon a broader hypothesis: that residents of socioeconomically distressed neighborhoods or regions are negatively impacted by their residential choice. Several causal mechanisms have been cited to support such a hypothesis. Poor areas may have relatively limited access to areas of job growth, underdeveloped formal or informal employment networks, or might breed disadvantage by exposing youth to fewer educational resources (Kain 1968; Gephardt 1997) . Credit constraints, costs associated with gathering information on opportunities in distant cities, or housing cost differentials may prevent some individuals from arbitraging spatial socioeconomic disparities (Glaeser and Gyourko 2004; Wozniak 2006) .
In recent years, a number of experimental and quasi-experimental studies, including several derived from the Federal Moving to Opportunity demonstration program (MTO), have assessed the potential impact of relocating individuals within a metropolitan area (Oreopoulos 2003; Jacob 2004; Kling et al. 2007; Turney et al. 2006) . Much of this evidence indicates that the impact of these small-scale moves is minimal.
The potential impact of moving individuals across metropolitan areas could be much greater than the observed impact of local mobility. If labor markets are truly integrated throughout a metropolitan area, and transportation within a metropolitan area is relatively inexpensive, then one would expect neighborhood-level moves to be of little consequence for employment-related outcomes. Prospects for across-metropolitan area mobility experiments are undoubtedly dim, however, partly because of ethical concerns and partly because concerns about selection into the sample of individuals willing to participate in such an experiment -present in the MTO program -would profoundly threaten the generalizability of the results.
An ideal, albeit ethically worrisome, across-metropolitan area mobility experiment would draw study participants from a particularly depressed city, compel their participation, and give participants little if any power to select their destination. Participants would have access to a standard array of unemployment and social insurance benefits, but would not be guaranteed jobs in their destination city. If of a sufficiently large magnitude, the experiment might risk contamination of its control group, by fundamentally altering the balance of labor demand and supply in the origin region. This concern could be addressed by tracking participants' outcomes before and after relocation, or by comparing their outcomes to those of individuals residing in similarly distressed cities.
Hurricane Katrina comes reasonably close to satisfying these conditions. It caused a near total evacuation of a relatively depressed metropolitan area. 1 Ten months after landfall, the population of the New Orleans metropolitan area was more than one-quarter smaller than on July 1, 2005 (Census Bureau, 2006) . Evacuees, particularly those who failed to evacuate until after landfall, often did not choose their initial destination. In the aftermath of the storm, stories in the popular press have hypothesized that many former New Orleans-area residents will find better lives for themselves elsewhere, an argument fully consistent with the view that residence in a depressed area negatively influences outcomes.
2
Anecdotes regarding individual evacuees making better lives for themselves in other cities, such as this article's epigraph, are easily found. It is unclear, however, whether these stories are typical or exceptional.
To be sure, there are clear points of departure between Hurricane Katrina and an idealized mobility experiment. The storm caused considerable destruction of life and property, causing trauma that would generally not be present in a controlled trial. Thus, even in the event that Katrina-related evacuation were found to have positive impacts on labor market outcomes, it would be inappropriate to conclude that the hurricane caused a net improvement in individuals' quality of life. A second limitation of the analysis of Katrina evacuees is that the event's recency precludes any study of long-term impacts. It is quite conceivable that the benefits of residence in a more economically vibrant city take time to accrue, as relocated individuals learn more about opportunities available and make human capital investments required to realize gains. It is also possible that many evacuees expended little effort on job search activities in their new locations, because they expected to move back to the affected region eventually. Even evacuees with no desire to return may have had difficulties convincing prospective employers of their intentions. In spite of these limitations, the evacuation presents a rare opportunity to investigate the relationship between residence in a depressed region and economic outcomes in the short-to-medium term.
Results indicate that Hurricane Katrina had a strong negative impact on the labor force participation and earned income of evacuees, particularly those who were unable to return to their initial address within a few weeks of landfall. Evacuees on the whole lost three weeks of work, on average, in 2005; the effect is concentrated particularly among those who did not immediately return to their pre-Katrina address; this group averaged a loss of nearly 10 weeks of work in the last four months of 2005. Non-returning evacuees show a profound shock to annual earnings in 2005. The negative impact of evacuation on labor supply and weekly earnings can be traced well into 2006. Point estimates suggest that the impact has lessened over time, but remains substantial at the end of the panel in October 2006. These effects are estimated using a quasi-difference-in-difference framework, comparing evacuees both to observably similar non-evacuees and to pre-Katrina observations of individuals who were destined to become evacuees.
Specifications interacting the effect of long-term evacuation with characteristics of the host community provide no evidence that economic characteristics, such as unemployment rates and price levels, influence evacuee labor force participation patterns. There is some evidence that evacuees who settled in areas with more generous welfare benefits, or greater numbers of fellow evacuees, earned more. These patterns could easily reflect selection rather than any true causal impact.
Hurricane Katrina occasioned much debate in the United States regarding the proper size and scope of the social safety net, raising particular concerns that the storm's victims were not properly served by government in its wake. Results derived from the March supplements to the CPS indicate that, at least in financial terms, evacuees received a significant boost in public assistance, and this assistance served to dampen the storm's impact on overall income in calendar year 2005. Evacuees also exhibit a tendency to increase their self-employment activities in response to the decline in paid employment. It is unclear whether public assistance, which is in most cases temporary by design, will similarly insulate evacuees against the effects of reduced employment observed in 2006.
In all, the results indicate that media reports of successful adjustments by Katrina evacuees do not accurately represent the average experience of those who have yet to return to their pre-evacuation address. They also provide no evidence to support the notion that residence in the greater New Orleans area had a causal negative impact on labor market-related outcomes. While it is still possible that prospects for long-term evacuees could improve in the long run, evidence suggests that it will take years for evacuees to match their pre-evacuation outcomes, and still more years for evacuees to realize a positive labor market return on their relocation.
Section II provides some basic background information on the city of New Orleans and its labor market prior to the hurricane. Section III describes the CPS sample of Katrina evacuees. Section IV provides a conceptual discussion outlining the arguments for positive and negative impacts of evacuation on outcomes. Section V describes the analysis sample and estimation strategy. Section VI presents results, and section VII concludes.
II. A Brief History of New Orleans
The city of New Orleans rose to prominence in the early part of the 19 th century. As a port city at the mouth of the nation's largest river system, the city played a strong role in the export of goods produced in the nation's interior. In 1840, the city was the fourth largest in the United States, representing sixth-tenths of one percent of the nation's population. As Figure 1 shows, the city continued to grow for a period of 120 years after 1840. This trajectory is somewhat misleading from a relative perspective, as population growth in the remainder of the country exceeded that in the city of New Orleans over this time period. By 1960, the city's rank in the size distribution of cities had declined substantially.
The relative decline of New Orleans over the 165 year period between 1840 and 2005 reflects three basic factors. First, continuous improvements in more direct transportation links between the central and Eastern United States vastly reduced New Orleans' importance as a port.
Second, the city and its surrounding region did not experience the degree of industrialization shown in other parts of the country in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, and likewise did not exhibit the growth in knowledge-based industries that marked growing areas in the past half-century. Finally, much of the absolute decline since 1960 has been attributed to the racial integration of the city's schools, which spurred a wave of suburbanization on the part of white residents. In recent decades, however, both the white and black populations of the city have been declining. Figure 2 illustrates the net impact of these trends on employment patterns for New Orleans residents as of the 2000 Census. The height of each bar in this graph reflects the ratio of New Orleans employees in a given industry to national employment in that industry. The horizontal red line shows the ratio of New Orleans' population to that of the United States. Were the city a perfect microcosm of the nation, each bar would rise exactly to the height of the red line.
In fact, employment in eleven of fifteen industry groups is underrepresented in New Orleans relative to the nation as a whole. This pattern is strongest in the manufacturing sector and in sectors that have driven city growth in the post-industrial era: information, finance insurance and real estate, construction, and professional services. Given the city's legacy as a river port, it is somewhat surprising to note that the city does not have a particularly large number of employees in the transportation and warehousing sector. The only sectors of the economy with a disproportionate share of national employment are accommodations and food service and arts, entertainment and recreation. The economic base of the city is tourism, and a large number of residents find employment in the relatively low-paying sectors that cater to visitors.
Figure 2
The final column in Figure 2 shows the ratio of total employment among New Orleans residents to total employment in the United States. The failure of this bar to reach the horizontal red line suggests that the city had an overall underemployment problem in 2000. It is important to note, however, that these statistics do not correct for basic demographic differences between New Orleans residents and the remainder of the country. The low employment rate in New Orleans could reflect the relatively low skill levels of its residents. Table 1 provides an assessment of whether the less-skilled residents of greater New Orleans actually faced worse employment prospects than less-skilled residents of other metropolitan areas. The entries in this table are mean residuals from a regression of 2004 wage and salary income on a basic set of demographic and educational attainment indicators, for the sample of individuals between the ages of 18 and 65 with no more than a high school education in the 2005 American Community Survey. Largely because of the absolute decline in population since 1960, housing in New Orleans was in a condition of oversupply prior to Hurricane Katrina. In this respect, the city was similar to many other declining regions (Glaeser and Gyourko 2004) . According to the 2004 American Housing Survey, the median owner-occupied housing unit in the New Orleans metropolitan area measured 1,800 square feet and was valued at roughly $120,000. This valuation of $67 per square foot implies that it would have been impossible to make a profit by building standard-quality housing units in New Orleans prior to hurricane Katrina. 4 Overall, then, pre-Katrina New Orleans can be thought of as a place with a relative shortage of jobs, particularly high-paying low-skill jobs in growth industries. The impact of the weak labor market on residents' quality of life was blunted to some extent by the relatively low cost of housing in the city. Given the wholesale destruction of much of the city's housing stock, this equilibrium will be impossible to recreate absent massive subsidies to housing construction.
III.The Hurricane Katrina Evacuees
Information regarding the characteristics and outcomes of Hurricane Katrina evacuees is derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly enumerations spanning a period from August 2004 through October 2006. h e R S M e a n s c o m p a n y (www.rsmeans.com/calculator), the cost of building a one-story wood-frame structure, with brick veneer siding and 1,800 square feet in New Orleans would be $175,500, or $97.50 per square foot. While this estimate may reflect some degree of post-Katrina inflation in labor and materials cost, it is a low-end estimate and excludes architectural fees and contractor overhead. 5 Individuals with last scheduled interview dates in August 2005 or earlier are excluded from the analysis, as it is not possible to observe or infer evacuee status for this group.
longitudinal survey in which respondents are interviewed for four consecutive months, then not interviewed for eight months, and interviewed again for four consecutive months. Thus, some stated evacuees are observed both before and after the storm. Individuals who participated in the CPS prior to August 2005, but then evacuated and never returned to their home address, usually drop out of the longitudinal sample.
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Thus it is not possible to directly compare pre-and postevacuation characteristics for individuals who never return home. It is possible, however, to make inferences regarding which individuals dropped out of the sample because they evacuated in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. In this analysis, any individual observed as a resident of Louisiana or Mississippi prior to August 2005, with at least one scheduled interview after August 2005, who missed that interview and all subsequent interviews, is coded as an evacuee. These individuals are observed only prior to evacuation.
The CPS sampling frame excludes shelters and temporary living facilities such as hotels. It does, however, include trailers or other temporary living quarters installed at permanent addresses, and was expanded to include quasi-permanent communities of trailers established in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The CPS sample may therefore omit some long-term evacuees, potentially biasing estimates of the impact of evacuation. Several checks on the data, reported below, suggest that this bias is small. Table 2 reports summary statistics for some basic background characteristics for evacuees and the remainder of the population, using information from individuals' last observed interview date within the sampling frame of this analysis. For purposes of this and subsequent analysis, the sample is restricted to individuals between the ages of 25 and 65. The unweighted count of individuals who either report evacuee status at least once in their interview cycle, or meet the criteria stated above for inferring evacuee status, is nearly 2,000. Of these individuals, roughly 40% are long-term evacuees who never return to their pre-Katrina residence -half observed as individuals who unexpectedly exit the CPS sample after August 2005, the other half observed as claiming evacuee status afterward -and 25% are individuals who do return to their pre-Katrina residence. The remaining portion of the sample consists of individuals who report conflicting information about evacuee status, claiming that they had evacuated in at least one wave, but denying this claim in their last interview. These "deniers" will be treated as a separate category of potential evacuee in much of the remaining analysis. 6 For example, a total of 9 individuals are observed both in the March 2005 CPS and as nonreturning evacuees in the March 2006 CPS. Based on estimates of the total number of longterm evacuees, the actual number should have been between 100 and 150. 7 The best rational explanation for the existence of deniers is that individuals may have learned to respond "no" to the Katrina evacuee question in order to avoid the follow-up questions, Given the ubiquitous press coverage of the storm's aftermath, it is hardly surprising to learn that evacuees were in many respects disadvantaged relative to the population at large. Overall, evacuees are disproportionately AfricanAmerican, less-educated, more likely to be female, and less likely to be married with a spouse present in the household. Despite this lower marriage rate, evacuees are equally likely to reside with young children.
thereby shortening their interview.
Within the set of evacuees, there is a stark disparity between those who had returned to their pre-Katrina address by the date of their last interview and those who had not. The latter group is on average nearly five years younger, almost twice as likely to be African-American, twenty percentage points less likely to be married with a spouse present in the household, yet if anything more likely to be living with children under the age of five. This remarkable degree of disparity foreshadows many of the results to be revealed below, which will indicate that returnees are faring far better than longer-term evacuees.
The group of "deniers" generally looks quite comparable to the evacuee population as a whole. Relative to the remainder of the population, deniers are disproportionately African-American, female, less-educated, and unmarried. Along many dimensions, they range somewhere between the characteristics of returnees and long-term evacuees. Thus, it seems plausible to conclude that deniers are truly evacuees, rather than individuals who accidentally claimed evacuee status in one or more interviews. Table 2 provides the first piece of evidence suggesting that the CPS managed to assemble a reasonably representative sample of evacuees. Summary statistics for the group of individuals presumed to become evacuees, because they unexpectedly exit the sample, are generally similar to those for long-term evacuees observed after landfall. None of the differences in means or proportions reported are statistically significant at conventional levels. The lowest p-value for any of these hypothesis tests is 0.24. The samples are also of comparable size. 8 This assuages concerns that the post-Katrina sample is selected to exclude a nonrandom set of evacuees, and provides support for the empirical strategy of using one group as an effective control for the other.
As a further check on the reliability of CPS data, note that among the 1,492 evacuees observed post-Katrina, 408 or 27% are confirmed long-term evacuees. This figure 10 Thus, the Current Population Survey captures a reasonable number of persistent evacuees under the assumptions that a) the entire population of the affected metropolitan areas evacuated, b) all long-term evacuees left the New Orleans metropolitan area, and c) all deniers are in fact true evacuees. The first two assumptions are certainly faulty -there were at least some residents who did not evacuate, and many evacuees returned to their home counties even if they did not return to their home address. The third assumption may be as well. Relaxing all three assumptions simultaneously leads to no clear conclusion regarding whether the CPS captured too many or too few persistent evacuees.
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In all, the evidence does not point to an obvious source of bias associated with the CPS sampling strategy.
IV. Should the Katrina Effect Be Positive or Negative?
As mentioned in the introduction, Hurricane Katrina had a clear negative impact through damage to uninsured or underinsured property, as well as through the loss of local amenities. Abstracting from these losses, could the mass relocation of the population of greater New Orleans be beneficial to evacuees?
To argue that forced relocation is beneficial for an individual is to argue that the individual was suboptimally located in initial equilibrium. A number of market frictions, including moving costs, zoning laws, past or present discrimination, or costs of gathering information on alternative locations, could potentially justify this argument. The possibility that households, particularly those located in distressed neighborhoods within declining metropolitan areas, have systematically made suboptimal or inappropriately constrained location choices underlies the so-called "spatial mismatch" hypothesis (Kain, 1968) and numerous other theoretical arguments positing a causal link between locational characteristics and individual outcomes (Gephardt 1997; Ellen and Turner 1997) . These arguments have inspired numerous studies attempting to measure the relationship between neighborhood or metropolitan area-specific characteristics and individual outcomes (for reviews, see Jencks and Mayer 1990 , Ellen and Turner 1997 , Gephardt 1997 and Vigdor 2006 .
These arguments have also motivated policy interventions including the MTO demonstration program, which randomly assigned residents of public housing projects in one of five cities to receive housing vouchers good only for 10 These population estimates are collected at popest.org/popestla2006/. 11 Relaxing assumption (a) implies that the IRS and Census estimates overstate the proportion of evacuees who are long-term evacuees. Relaxing assumption (b) implies that the IRS and Census estimates understate the proportion of evacuees who are long-term evacuees. Relaxing assumption (c) implies that the proportion of evacuees who are long-term evacuees is greater than 27%.
units in low-poverty neighborhoods, to receive unrestricted vouchers, or to receive no special assistance (Kling et al., 2007) . From a theoretical perspective, a voucher that restricts household location choices can only improve outcomes relative to an unrestricted voucher with the same cash value if households systematically make suboptimal choices regarding where to live. If such a presumption is in fact true, then it might be reasonable to expect that households forced to relocate following a natural disaster such as Hurricane Katrina are rendered better off in the long run.
Evidence from MTO evaluations conducted to date provide a limited amount of evidence that relocation from a high-poverty neighborhood improves individual outcomes. While recipients of the restricted vouchers generally post no income gains relative to other groups, they do report higher levels of self-reported mental health and show improvements in physical health in at least some dimensions. There is also some evidence that relocation to a low-poverty neighborhood improves behavioral outcomes for girls, while potentially worsening such outcomes for boys (Kling et al. 2007 ). The non-uniformity of the results in the end provides little guidance regarding whether placing restrictions on location choice improves the welfare of participating households. Such households may, for example, be willing to trade off lower self-reported mental health for fewer behavior problems from their male children.
While the MTO demonstration program can be used to measure the potential benefits of constraining location choices within a metropolitan area, there are a number of additional potential benefits associated with relocating across metropolitan areas. Neighborhoods in the same city share the same school system, and many of the potential benefits from switching schools within that system can be achieved by use of existing school choice programs implemented in many cities. Neighborhoods in the same city also share, to a large extent, the same labor market. If a metropolitan area offers few opportunities for low-skilled workers, location within that area should matter little for employment-related outcomes. By contrast, relocating families from a depressed city such as New Orleans to more affluent metropolitan areas with more robust job markets and better-functioning public schools could have a much more positive impact.
There are two main counterarguments to the view that evacuation was beneficial. The first is a basic revealed preference argument, hinging on the opinion that market frictions inhibiting migration between metropolitan areas are ultimately unimportant. The second refers to the possibility that the benefits of relocation will take time to accrue, while most of the costs are immediate. Previous research suggests that workers displaced through plant closings or other exogenous labor demand shocks exhibit reduced rates of employment and earnings for several years. Estimates suggest that the earnings losses following job displacement range between 15 and 25 percent in the first few years after separation; negative impacts can be traced as far as ten years past separation (Schoeni and Darda 1997; Stevens 1997; see Kletzer 1998 for a review of the job displacement literature).
It is not clear how well the results from the worker displacement literature will forecast to the outcomes of Katrina evacuees. Studies of displaced workers attribute much of their hardship to industry-or firm-specific human capital, which becomes less valuable following a separation (Hamermesh, 1987) . Many Katrina evacuees worked in very low-skilled occupations, where the value of firmspecific human capital is undoubtedly slight. Displaced worker studies often focused on manufacturing employees who were released into local economies that had just experienced negative shocks to labor demand. Katrina evacuees, by contrast, often relocated to metropolitan areas with demonstrably stronger labor demand. Finally, many evacuees were unemployed or underemployed to begin with, reducing the likelihood that relocation could have a negative impact on earnings. On the other hand, evacuees face a simultaneous loss of job and relocation. This may pose additional difficulties even in the event that their destination has a more robust labor market.
In summary, the long-run impact of Hurricane Katrina-related evacuation could be either positive or negative. Job displacement has been shown to have long-ranging impacts on earnings and labor supply, but Katrina evacuees exhibited a low employment rate prior to evacuation, and worked disproportionately in low-skilled jobs. Moreover, relocation took most evacuees to metropolitan areas with stronger initial labor market conditions. It would be reasonable to expect large negative initial impacts of evacuation that dissipate over time, perhaps leading to positive impacts in the long run.
V. Estimation Strategy
The primary challenge for evaluating the impact of Hurricane Katrina on evacuees is inferring what those individuals would have experienced had the storm not occurred, or had they not been forced to evacuate. Unlike the MTO demonstration program, there is no readily identifiable control group designed to estimate this counterfactual. This study will employ a simple difference-indifference methodology to infer the impact of evacuation on evacuees. Implementation of this strategy requires a source of data that provides observations on both evacuees and non-evacuees before and after the storm occurred. In principle, the Current Population Survey satisfies this criterion, for reasons described in Section III above, with the caveat that two independent samples of long-term evacuees are utilized, one representing the pre-and one the post-evacuation period. Since the analysis does not rely on a true longitudinal link of pre-and post-Katrina observations, the sample includes information on all individuals who were asked questions about their evacuee status between November 2005 and October 2006, regardless of whether they entered the CPS sample before or after the storm.
The analysis sample is restricted to individuals between the ages of 25 and 65. There are roughly 433,000 person-month observations representing 133,000 unique individuals in the pre-Katrina period. This total includes 2,785 monthly observations on 846 unique individuals coded as evacuees for purposes of this analysis. Of these, 435 unexpectedly drop out of the sample after August 2005 -the long-term evacuees observed pre-evacuation noted in The post-Katrina sample consists of roughly 976,000 person-month observations on 282,000 unique individuals, of which 5,000 observations on nearly 1,500 unique individuals report having evacuated due to Hurricane Katrina in at least one survey wave. These are the returnees, long-term evacuees observed post-evacuation, and deniers described in Table 2 .
Most estimated equations will be of the form:
where i indexes individuals and t time. The outcome variable Y is a measure of employment, or earnings. The term α is a month-specific fixed effect. The vector X contains information on age, race, gender, educational attainment, marital status, and presence of own children under five in the household. Individuals who either are or destined to become evacuees are identified by the indicator variable E i . The effect of evacuation will be estimated by the coefficient β 3 , associated with the interaction between E i and the variable P t , which identifies whether a month is before or after August 2005. The ε term is an individual-by-month specific error term. In some specifications, evacuees observed in the post-Katrina time period will be differentiated by whether they have returned to their pre-evacuation address.
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These two groups are further distinguished from "deniers," who make inconsistent claims regarding their evacuee status. These models will take the form:
Note that a number of evacuees who have not returned to their pre-Katrina address actually reside in the New Orleans or Gulfport-Biloxi areas, or in proximate areas such as Baton Rouge. Alternative specifications reported in footnotes below will examine the implications of excluding these "near-returnees" from the broader sample of long-term evacuees.
where the added term L it indicates an individual who either is or is destined to become a long-term evacuee as of time t, the term R it indicates an evacuee who has returned to his or her pre-Katrina address by time t, and the term D it indicates an individual who claims evacuee status at some point in the CPS interview cycle, but not at time t. The impact of evacuation on long-term evacuees will thus be inferred by comparing the difference in outcomes between individuals destined to become long-term evacuees and evacuees themselves to trends for observationally similar non-evacuees and returnees. Identification rests on the assumption that this group would have exhibited changes in outcomes similar to the counterfactual group in the absence of evacuation. Two checks on this assumption are reported below: introducing interactions of the post-evacuation indicator with the vector X it , and adding metropolitan area fixed effects to restrict outcome comparisons to be between observationally similar individuals residing in the same regions.
Estimates of the impact of evacuation on long-term evacuees should not be interpreted as the impact of long-term evacuation. Rather, it should be interpreted as evidence of heterogeneity in a treatment effect. Results below will show that long-term evacuees are faring much worse than returnees. It is quite possible that returnees would have done just as well even if they had been forced to remain in their evacuated location, and that long-term evacuees would still be faring poorly even if offered a chance to return.
In subsequent specifications the impact of evacuation will be allowed to vary over time, to study the process of recovery from the initial shock to labor force participation. Models will be estimated to assess the lingering impact of evacuation on all evacuees, and then specifically on those evacuees who have yet to return to their pre-evacuation address.
Finally, in still other specifications, current evacuees will be distinguished by characteristics of their current metropolitan area of residence. These characteristics include the logarithm of metropolitan population as of July 1, 2005, the population growth rate between 2000 and 2005, the logarithm of fair market rent for a two bedroom apartment, the logarithm of the monthly TANF benefit for a family of three in the state where the majority of the metropolitan area's population resides, the unemployment rate as of July 2005, the logarithm of distance to New Orleans, and the logarithm of the number of metropolitan area residents employed in the arts, entertainment, accommodation, and food service industries.
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As evacuees may sort endogenously into metropolitan areas with differing characteristics, these estimates are best considered descriptive in nature. They might either suggest something about the nature of the causal impact of 13 Population, growth, employment, and unemployment figures are derived from US Census publications; distance to New Orleans is between city centers, measured in miles using Google Earth software; fair market rent data is taken from the HUD FMR documentation system, and TANF benefits are taken from the welfare rules database maintained by the Urban Institute.
location characteristics on evacuee outcomes, or the nature of the evacuee sorting process. (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004 ).
VI. Results

VI.A Basic Estimates of the Impact of Evacuation
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The earnings specification is estimated by tobit, to account for the high frequency of respondents with zero earnings. Clustering is not required in the weekly earnings analysis as there is at most one pre-and one-post evacuation observation per respondent. The specifications use a set of three explanatory variables: an indicator for whether an individual is destined to become, is, or was an evacuee, a binary indicator for months after August 2005, and an interaction between these two binary indicators. The result is a basic difference-in-difference style estimate.
Consistent with the notion that residents of the New Orleans and GulfportBiloxi areas had relatively poor economic outcomes even prior to the hurricane, main effects reveal that evacuees worked significantly fewer hours and were significantly less likely to be employed prior to evacuation. Relative to other individuals between the ages of 25 and 65, individuals destined to become evacuees worked nearly 2 fewer hours in the week prior to a CPS interview, and were four percentage points less likely to be employed in the preceding month. These effects are relatively sizable: the average number of hours worked by individuals in the CPS is 32, with a standard deviation of 20; and roughly 73% of respondents in the analysis sample report employment in the preceding month. The point estimate in the earnings specification indicates that evacuees-to-be earned quite a bit less than others, but this estimate is insignificant.
14 Among the remedies suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, clustering is most appropriate given the relatively short panel length for each individual and the relatively large number of individuals. The results indicate a modest, yet statistically significant, trend towards increased labor force participation and higher earnings over time, as respondents reported working an extra 8 minutes each week, were 0.3 percentage points more likely to be employed, and earned nearly 8% more in nominal terms, after August 2005. This trend quite clearly did not hold for Hurricane Katrina evacuees, however. The interaction term between evacuee and the post-Katrina time period is negative and significant in all three specifications, indicating that evacuees, on average, worked an average of 3 fewer hours per week after the storm relative to before, were 8.3 percentage points less likely to be employed in the month prior to the survey, and suffered a major decrease in earnings.
Indicators of significant differences between those destined to become Katrina evacuees and others prior to August 2005 raise serious concerns that the simple difference-in-difference estimates may fail to accurately represent the true impact of the storm on individual outcomes. Any contemporaneous trends towards worse (or better) outcomes for those with tenuous labor force attachments will bias these coefficients. To address these concerns, Table 4 presents refined estimates of the impact of evacuation, adding a set of demographic control variables to the simple Table 3 specifications. These additional variables, including a quadratic in age, and indicators for black individuals, marital status, presence of own children under 5 in the household, and educational attainment, improve the fit of both models and display a quite sensible pattern of results. The educational attainment indicators are not mutually exclusive. Labor force attachment is particularly strong among the more educated, among those closer to 40 years old, and among married males and males with young children. Attachment is weak for those who are black and females, especially those who are married and live with their own children. Earnings also tend to be higher among the more educated; among those closer to age 35, among married males with young children, and among unmarried childless females. The specifications also incorporate month fixed effects, as in equation (1).
The introduction of these control variables substantially attenuates the main effect of Katrina evacuee status. In other words, the tendency for individuals destined to become evacuees to display lesser degrees of labor force attachment and lower earnings prior to the storm can largely be explained on the basis of other observable characteristics. By contrast, the interaction terms, which identify the difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of evacuation itself, are only slightly attenuated relative to Table 3. In the labor force attachment specifications, the coefficient is roughly 10% smaller than in the more parsimonious specification; both coefficients retain statistical significance at the 1% level. The weekly earnings coefficient is reduced by a larger proportion, but continues to indicate a substantial negative impact of evacuation. The point estimates indicate that after evacuating, evacuees were 7.5 percentage points less likely to work for pay in the month prior to a CPS enumeration, averaged 2.5 fewer hours of work in the week prior to the survey, and earned only 42 cents for every dollar in pre-evacuation income. Together, these estimates indicate that evacuees had a hard time finding employment, worked a large number of hours in the event they found it, but earned much less.
Further specification checks, not reported here, show that these results are highly robust. Adding a complete set of interaction terms between the demographic and educational controls in Table 4 and the post-August 2005 indicator, to introduce the possibility of differential trends over time, has no impact on the magnitude of the estimated coefficient. Adding metropolitan area fixed effects to the hours worked and employment specifications attenuates the coefficients of interest by a small amount -less than 10% in both cases. 15 15 Metropolitan fixed effects were not added to the earnings model, owing to the bias inherent in adding fixed effects to tobit models. It should be noted that given the binary nature of almost all control variables, the results obtained with metropolitan area fixed effects provide a reliable expected value of estimates that would result from a nearest-neighbor matching type model, with matching on observed demographics and metropolitan area characteristics. Matching Table 5 presents estimates of the model in equation (2) above, which distinguishes evacuees in the post-Katrina period by whether they had returned to their pre-Katrina address at the time of enumeration, remained in a different location, or temporarily denied evacuee status. The results reveal a striking disparity between "returnees" and long-term evacuees, which was perhaps foreshadowed by the differences in basic summary statistics revealed in Table 2 above. Relative to other evacuees, those destined not to return to their preKatrina addres, or "non-returnees," showed symptoms of lower labor force attachment and significantly lower earnings prior to evacuation, even conditional models, generally most appropriate in scenarios where the relationship between dependent and independent variables is highly nonlinear, would in this case reduce precision without addressing further concerns regarding the construction of a true "control" group. on the other covariates included in Table 4 . From an economic perspective, it is not surprising to see that evacuees who have not returned to greater New Orleans had a more tenuous attachment to the local labor market to begin with.
Returnees display no significant ill effects in terms of labor force attachment or earnings relative to their pre-evacuation outcomes. In fact, point estimates suggests that these individuals actually work more after the storm, though the interaction terms are small and not statistically significant. Nonreturnees display a very large, significant tendency to work less after evacuation, even relative to the low pre-evacuation levels. The point estimate of 6 fewer hours of work in the week prior to an interview is equivalent to more than onequarter of a standard deviation. The probability of employment in the month prior to the survey falls by 16 percentage points for this group. The estimated impact on weekly earnings is very large: for every dollar this group earned prior to evacuation, they are estimated to earn ten cents afterwards. Thus, the failure to distinguish between returnees and long-term evacuees obscures a remarkable disparity in experiences. 16 Evacuees who have returned to a state of normality in terms of physical location have also attained a state of relative normalcy in the labor market. Long-term evacuees, by contrast, have extremely elevated rates of non-employment and have witnessed a decimation of their already low earnings.
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It is important to reiterate that these estimates should be interpreted as evidence of heterogeneity in the impact of evacuation, rather than of a differential impact associated with long-term evacuation. 18 Indeed, it is quite likely that longterm evacuees would have had more difficult experiences even if they had returned to their pre-Katrina address. Nonetheless, the finding that such evacuees are undergoing a difficult experience relative to observably similar individuals strongly contrasts the view that evacuees are finding their way to greater prosperity outside the greater New Orleans area. 16 As mentioned in note 12 above, the sample of non-returnees includes a number of evacuees who reported residence in the New Orleans, Gulfport-Biloxi, or Baton Rouge metropolitan areas, but had not returned to their pre-Katrina address. Excluding this group from the sample of non-returnees produces larger estimated coefficients on the interaction of non-returnee and post-August 2005. The coefficient in the hours worked specification is -7.51 rather than -6.07; the coefficient in the probability of employment specification is -0.201 rather than -0.164, and the coefficient in the log weekly earnings specification is -2.48 rather than -2.28. Additional alternative specifications show that near-returnees fared significantly better than other nonreturnees, but significantly worse than true returnees. 17 Models with metropolitan area fixed effects, associated with slightly attenuated effect estimates in Table 4 , have a similar impact here, reducing the estimated impact of evacuation for long-term evacuees by roughly 6% in the hours worked and employment specifications. 18 In additional unreported specifications, the impact of evacuation was permitted to vary by race or by educational attainment. In general, the impact of evacuation and persistent evacuation is more negative among African Americans and among those with lower levels of education.
Individuals who deny evacuee status in a given month appear to form something of an intermediate case: they show significantly lower levels of labor force participation and lower earnings, but the coefficient magnitudes are onethird to one-half the size of those exhibited by long-term evacuees.
VI.B Tracing the Impact of Evacuation Over Time
Do the labor market impacts of evacuation diminish over time? If so, how long does it take before evacuees return to a normal level of labor force participation? Tables 6 and 7 present estimates that address these questions, tracing the impact of evacuation for all evacuees and for long-term evacuees, respectively.
In Table 6 , the variables of interest are interactions of evacuee status with an exhaustive set of 12 month indicator variables.
Evacuees in these specifications are not distinguished by their location at the time of the interview. These specifications show a large, significant initial impact of evacuation that diminishes over time. In November 2005, evacuees reported almost 4 fewer hours of work in the week prior to their interview, were 12 percentage points less likely to be employed in the previous month, and reported the equivalent of a 95% drop in weekly earnings, though this last effect is estimated imprecisely owing to the smaller sample size in the MORG data. All three effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. Six months later, in May 2006, all three estimates are much smaller, and only one is statistically significant at the 10% level.
Of the fifteen coefficient estimates representing later months, only two are significant at the 10% level. All but two of these fifteen estimates are negative, which points towards the conclusion that there were some lingering effects of evacuation even a year after Hurricane Katrina, but these impacts were of relatively small magnitude -perhaps a loss of 1 hour per week, a one or two percentage point decrease in the likelihood of employment, and a reduction in earnings on the order of 20%. Although estimated imprecisely, the earnings reduction estimates are entirely consistent with the existing literature on the impact of job displacement.
Interestingly, the reduction in effect magnitude and significance around June 2006 coincides with the expiration of Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits for individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina. The DUA program provides benefits to individuals who become unemployed as the direct consequences of an officially declared disaster, but are ineligible for ordinary unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. The DUA program ordinarily provides benefits for up to 26 weeks, but President Bush extended the program for an additional 13 weeks in March 2006. The extension allowed individuals who had exhausted their UI benefits to apply for further assistance. The extension expired on June 3, 2006. T h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s i n T a b l e 7 r e p l a c e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f m o n t h w i t h evacuee status with an interaction between month and long-term evacuee status. Once again, the possibility of selection into long-term evacuee status implies that this exercise measures effect heterogeneity, rather than the effect of long-term evacuation itself. Non-returnees exhibited much greater initial declines in labor force participation prior to evacuation, even relative to the low pre-Katrina levels exhibited by individuals destined to become long-term evacuees. In November 2005, this group averaged over 9 fewer hours of work, displayed a 27 percentage point reduction in the probability of employment, and witnessed a 95% reduction in earned income relative to the pre-evacuation period.
By most measures, progress on the road to recovery has been much slower for long-term evacuees relative to evacuees as a whole.
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By May 2006, nonreturnees still exhibit a significant six-hour-per-week reduction in work hours, and a 16 percentage point decline in the probability of employment. The impact on weekly earnings is positive and insignificant in this month, but this is a clear anomaly relative to estimates from adjoining months. Evidence on progress beyond this point is hampered by the relative imprecision of the regression estimates, which reflects the relatively small number of long-term evacuees sampled in each month. Suffice to say there is no evidence of a monotonic trend towards recovery in this group. There is also no clear evidence that the expiration of DUA benefits in early June 2006 had any significant impact on this group. A year after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, point estimates indicate that long-term evacuees are still working an average of five fewer hours per week, are at least 10 percentage points less likely to be employed, and are earning only a small fraction of the income they received prior to evacuation.
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The magnitude of earnings losses posted by persistent evacuees, though measured imprecisely, is quite a bit larger than estimates in the traditional job displacement literature.
19 One concern with this estimation strategy is that long-term evacuees may have become a more negatively selected group over time, as some individuals drop out of this group as they return to their pre-Katrina address. Within the analysis sample, there are 84 cases of current evacuees dropping out of the sample before the end of their CPS interview cycle. These dropouts are significantly more educated than the overall sample of current evacuees: whereas 22% of current evacuees have a college degree, 27% of evacuees who drop out of the sample early have such a degree. To gauge the impact of this attrition on estimates of the impact of current evacuee status, the models in Table 7 were re-estimated, excluding individuals who dropped out of the sample prior to the end of their CPS interview cycle. The results are substantively unchanged from those reported in Table 7 . 20 Excluding non-returnees residing in the New Orleans, Gulfport-Biloxi, or Baton Rouge metropolitan areas from the sample does not affect these conclusions.
VI.C Spatial Variation in the Impact of Evacuation
Katrina evacuees relocated to a large number of settings. In the CPS data, selfreported current evacuees were found in 94 different metropolitan areas, as well as nonmetropolitan areas. In theory, the outcomes of evacuees might well have been influenced by the characteristics of the host community -indeed, such a presumption is at the heart of the spatial mismatch hypothesis. In practice, disentangling any effect of host community characteristics from the potentially endogenous selection into host communities on the part of evacuees would be a difficult task.
21 Table 8 presents basic evidence on the relationship between host community characteristics and the experiences of Katrina evacuees.
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This evidence does not necessarily represent the causal impact of community characteristics on evacuee outcomes; it may also describe the endogenous sorting of evacuees into host communities.
Non-returnees evacuating to larger cities show a tendency towards lower labor force participation; coefficients in the hours worked and employment specifications are significant at the 10% level.
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At the same time, this group appears to earn more, though this effect is insignificant at conventional levels. Evacuees in faster-growing cities fared neither better nor worse than others. Evacuees in cities with higher housing costs, as measured by fair market rents determined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, report insignificant increases in labor force participation and income. Evacuees in cities with higher welfare benefits show an insignificant tendency towards working more hours and earn significantly more. This basic evidence suggests that disincentives inherent in the welfare system did not contribute significantly to evacuees' reduction in work effort.
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Evacuees do not appear to fare worse in cities with higher pre-existing unemployment rates.
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Evacuees in cities with a 21 Media reports shortly after the storm indicate that there may have been at least some randomness to the pattern of evacuee relocation. Some evacuees reported being placed on an airplane, unaware of its destination until they arrived. Were these initial locations, and the manner by which respondents arrived at those initial locations, recorded in some way it might be possible to instrument for current location characteristics with initial location characteristics. There does not appear to be any data source which records this information, however. 22 The reported specifications include interactions of current evacuee status with eight community-level characteristics. Specifications including only one such interaction generate a set of results very similar to those reported here. 23 In models including only the interaction between non-returnee and log of city population, these coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 24 Previous evidence does indicate a potential response to the expiration of DUA benefits. These are portable benefits; from the individual recipient's perspective the benefit amount does not vary across locations. 25 In a model including only the interaction between non-returnee and unemployment rates, evacuees tend to earn significantly more in cities with higher unemployment rates. The effect higher concentration of employees in the accommodation and food service industry -the dominant industry in the New Orleans area -show some signs of working more but earn significantly less.
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Evacuees who traveled greater distances do neither better nor worse than others. Finally, evacuees tend to earn significantly more when they locate in a metropolitan area with a higher concentration of fellow evacuees. As the last row of the table indicates, F-tests for joint significance of the city characteristic interactions fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effects in the hours and employment specifications, but reject this hypothesis in the earnings model.
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The inability to separate potential treatment effects from selection effects in these specifications limits their inferential usefulness. For example, the tendency toward higher earnings in cities with a higher concentration of evacuees may indicate that evacuee communities form referral networks that lead to placements in higher paying jobs, but might also indicate that evacuees congregated in areas with higher average pay. As descriptive evidence, however, they show a quite striking lack of correlation between community-level characteristics such as growth and unemployment rates and evacuee outcomes. Moving to a city with a vibrant economy, or with industrial composition similar to that in New Orleans, was not a guarantee of evacuee success.
VI.D The March Supplement: Impacts on Annual Income
Monthly CPS and MORG interviews collect only a limited amount of information on potentially interesting economic and social outcomes. A larger array of information is available in the March supplement to the CPS, which collects additional information regarding annual earnings and other sources of income in the previous calendar year, as well as information on health insurance coverage and self-reported health status. The remaining tables in this paper evaluate outcomes taken from the March supplements of 2005 and 2006. In each specification, the sample is limited to those for whom Katrina evacuee status can be inferred. In 2006, this includes all respondents who were part of the main CPS sampling frame. In 2005, this includes respondents in a longitudinal sample who were scheduled to have at least one interview after August 2005. Table 9 presents the results of specifications that are fundamentally similar to those in Table 4 , focusing on two measures of income in the previous calendar year and weeks worked in the previous calendar year. Estimates in the log total income and log earnings models are derived from a tobit specifications, similar to those used in the weekly earnings models above.
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The weeks worked specification is estimated by OLS. The sample for each outcome variable is greatly reduced relative to prior specifications, as observations are drawn from only two months. As a result, the precision of many regression estimates is considerably lower than in previous tables.
Point estimates indicate that individuals destined to become evacuees collected considerably less income, from earnings and from other sources, in calendar year 2004. This effect is noteworthy particularly because the specification controls separately for education levels, race, and family status, which undoubtedly differ significantly between evacuees and the population at large. The estimated effect of evacuee-to-be status is significant at the 10% level when analyzing the logarithm of total income, but not for earnings.
The actual impact of evacuation on these measures is given by the interaction term between the evacuee indicator and the year 2006 indicator. Both point estimates are negative, indicating that evacuation reduced both earnings and total income by about 30% in 2005 relative to 2006; however standard errors on both estimates are rather large and neither coefficient can be statistically distinguished from zero. The magnitude of these estimates is consistent with the estimated impact on weekly earnings, bearing in mind that the impact on weekly earnings would have been experienced only for the last four months of 2005.
The impact of evacuation on labor supply, as measured by weeks worked, shown in the tables' third column, is statistically significant. The point estimate indicates that evacuees, who displayed no significant tendency towards greater or fewer weeks worked prior to evacuation, lost an average of three weeks' worth of work in 2005. Table 10 presents the results of specifications that are analogous to those in Table 5 , separating evacuees in March 2006 by whether they had returned to their pre-Katrina address, remained away from that address, or denied evacuee status in that month. 29 As in that earlier table, the results here should be viewed as demonstrating heterogeneity in the effect of evacuation, rather than the effect of long-term evacuation as a distinct event. Results show once again that nonreturnees are faring poorly relative to other evacuees. The impact on annual earnings is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that non-returnees earned only eleven cents for every dollar of income in the preceding calendar year. The effect seems implausibly large, but is estimated rather imprecisely. There is a similarly negative association between long-term evacuee status and total annual income, though this difference is one-fourth the magnitude and not statistically significant. Point estimates indicate a substantial difference in the labor supply of returnees relative to long-term evacuees. The estimate for returnees, though insignificant, suggests that this group lost less than two weeks of work in 2005. Long-term evacuees, by contrast, lost 10 weeks of work on average. This amounts to the majority of time remaining in calendar year 2005 after Katrina's landfall. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. Hurricane Katrina did much to expose the vulnerability of poorer members of American society. It raised many questions regarding the viability of a social "safety net" in the United States, and engendered a public debate regarding societal obligations towards socially and economically marginalized groups. Results in Table 10 above suggest that some form of insurance mechanism operated for Katrina evacuees, as the estimated differences in earnings between long-term evacuees and observably similar non-evacuees are larger and more significant than the differences in total income.
Katrina evacuees were generally eligible to take up Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and Medicaid in their destination state, and some states were granted waivers to provide evacuees with more generous benefits funded with Federal dollars. Previously employed evacuees were eligible for unemployment insurance from their origin state. Between early September and late December 2005, the proportion of Louisiana UI claims paid to non-residents of the state increased from 8.5% to 46.8%. Individuals exhausting their six months' worth of UI coverage, or ineligible for UI benefits were eligible to apply for the DUA program referenced above, funded Federally but administered by evacuees' origin states. In the fourth quarter of 2005, between 38 and 51 percent of Louisiana DUA claims paid each week were paid to out-of-state claimants.
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Thus it would be reasonable to expect public assistance programs to cushion the blow of lost income for many evacuees. Welfare programs may have also discouraged evacuees from returning to work; recall, however, that persistent evacuees were somewhat more likely to work in states with more generous TANF benefits, and earned significantly more. Table 11 rounds out the analysis by examining non-earnings income for long-term evacuees and others, to ascertain which if any mechanisms can account for the relatively moderate estimated overall income difference. The specifications here closely resemble those in Table 10 , where evacuees are distinguished by whether they had returned to their pre-Katrina address, remained in a second location, or denied evacuee status in March 2006. Each regression specification is estimated with a Tobit model, to account for the prevalence of non-positive observations in each category of supplemental income.
Results in the first column indicate that all categories of evacuees experienced a substantial increase in public assistance income, defined as income from transfer programs including TANF and other cash welfare programs, unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and SSI. The most dramatic effect is among long-term evacuees, consistent with the notion that this group suffered the most negative shock to labor supply in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Public assistance received by this group is several orders of magnitude higher than levels reported by other categories of evacuees, or by non-evacuees with similar 32 Statistics provided by Research and Statistics Division, Louisiana Department of Labor. Regressions are weighted using CPS individual weights. Public assistance income is defined as the sum of income from unemployment compensation, disability insurance, SSI, and welfare programs. Private assistance income is defined as the sum of income from gifts from friends and relatives, child support, and alimony. Asset and entitlement income is defined as the sum of income from social security benefits, other retirement income, interest, dividends, rent, survivor's benefits, workmen's compensation, and veteran's benefits. Selfemployment income is defined as the sum of income from business, farming, hobbies, severance payments, foster care payments, and other sources. All specifications are estimated by Tobit. Clustering is not employed since there is at most one post-Katrina observation per individual. *** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
observed characteristics. While public assistance was concentrated in this group, it should be noted that both returnees and those who denied evacuee status in March 2006, but claimed it in other months, report dramatically elevated levels of public assistance income.
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33 The magnitudes of these effects may appear implausibly large. The coefficient of 12.1 for non-returnees, for example, implies that this group received $180,000 in public assistance benefits for every dollar received in the preceding year. Bear in mind, however, that these
The second column analyzes variation in the amount of private assistance income, defined as the sum of income that came in the form of gifts, child support, and alimony. While much of this income might be expected to arrive regardless of evacuee status, it is at least conceivable that donors of such assistance would be especially likely to act in the wake of the hurricane. In fact, there is some evidence that returnees enjoyed a significant increase in income from these sources. Private charity, as opposed to public assistance, may have been instrumental in allowing some evacuees to return to their homes.
The third column considers asset and entitlement income, defined as the sum of income from social security and retirement benefits, interest, dividends, rent, survivor's benefits, workmen's compensation, and veteran's benefits. One would not expect this form of income to respond to a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina, as it is largely determined by investments made or actions taken prior to the storm's landfall. The only possible exception to this rule would be rental income, which might be expected to fall for those who owned destroyed rental property in the gulf coast area, but increase for those who owned undamaged property. Indeed, there is no statistically significant evidence of a relationship between evacuation and this form of income.
The final specification analyzes self-employment income, defined as income from operating a business, farm, and "other" sources. The primary components of the "other" category are income from hobbies, foster care payments, and severance packages. Both returnees and long-term evacuees exhibit elevated levels of self-employment income in the post-Katrina period. The effect can also be measured in the pre-Katrina period, as the main effect of evacuee status is positive and significant at the 5% level. Evacuees show a persistent tendency towards entreprenuerial or self-directed economic activity, and this tendency is particularly pronounced in the post-evacuation period. Longterm evacuees show the strongest tendency to increase their self-employment earnings, as the interaction term identifying non-returnees is large and significant at the 1% level. Returnees also display tendency to increase their selfemployment income in the post-evacuation period, but the point estimate is not statistically significant. While this pattern might reflect increased creativity in finding gainful employment in a more chaotic labor market, it could also indicate that a number of evacuees received severance payments from employers who ceased operation after the storm made landfall. 34 coefficients are derived from tobit models, which may predict extremely low benefit levels for those who received none. 34 Alternative versions of the specifications in Table 11 excluding non-returnees residing in the New Orleans, Gulfport-Biloxi, or Baton Rouge metropolitan areas yield coefficients broadly similar to those reported here.
VII.Conclusions
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many observers speculated that the consequences of long-term evacuation might be positive in many cases, as individuals found more gainful employment in metropolitan areas with economies more vibrant than turn-of-the-millennium New Orleans. The results reported in this paper suggest that these long term benefits, if they exist, will take years to accrue. It will take still more years, if not a generation or more, for the net impact of evacuation to turn positive, given the severe negative short-run impacts. The results also suggest that anecdotal stories of short-run success are the exception rather than the rule, as the mean impact of current evacuee status on labor force participation-related outcomes is large, statistically significant, and negative. An alternative explanation consistent with the results is that persistent evacuees refrained from engaging in a full-fledged job search process because they expected to return to the New Orleans area eventually. The job search process may have also been complicated by employers' concerns that evacuees would not remain on the job for very long. While this alternative explanation introduces the possibility of larger short-to-medium run benefits of relocation, it also implies that either evacuees or employers perceived the long-run benefits to be small.
There is some evidence to suggest a partial recovery in evacuee labor supply. Interpretation of this evidence is hampered by statistical imprecision, and in any event suggests that the road to recovery for long-term Katrina evacuees will be much more difficult than for displaced workers previously studied by labor economists. Individuals who have returned to the greater New OrleansGulfport-Biloxi area, by contrast, have attained a degree of normalcy in their labor supply and earnings. There is very little evidence to suggest that evacuees who relocated to metropolitan areas with more robust labor markets fared better or worse than others. The clearest bright spot in the picture is that long term evacuees' total income appears to have been lifted relative to their earnings, in part by the governmental safety net and in part by evacuees' ability to secure income from severance payments or self-employment.
Overall, these results do not paint a promising future for persistent evacuees. The transfer income that appears to have sustained them through 2005 is designed to be temporary, and there is very little evidence of upward momentum in their labor force participation even 14 months after landfall. While it is most assuredly easy to find examples of success stories among the Katrina evacuees, the more general portrait provided by this evidence is of a societal problem that is not solving itself.
More generally, this evidence supports a growing body of experimental and quasi-experimental evidence that shows little support for spatial mismatch-type hypotheses positing a causal impact of locational characteristics on outcomes. There is no evidence here to support the notion that residents of New Orleans were foregoing a higher standard of living elsewhere because of moving costs or idiosyncratic attachment to place. Instead, they are more consistent with the notion that the poor labor market outcomes of these residents was a function primarily of their own personal characteristics and not of the place where they resided. As such, they imply that the most promising strategies for improving the welfare of individuals living in high poverty neighborhoods or regions is to directly target their skills and human capital.
